Interest and Discipline (Chapter 10 of Democracy and Education)

[この記事は、デューイ『民主主義と教育』(John. Dewey (1916) Democracy and Education. を読む授業のためのものです。目次ページはhttp://yanaseyosuke.blogspot.jp/2013/09/john-dewey-1916-democracy-and-education.htmlです。]

以下、引用はProject Gutenbergからします
(Project Gutenbergに掲載されている本の著作権は切れていますので、引用や転載は自由です)

なお、以下でつけられたページ番号は、Dover editionのページ番号です。また、Project Gutenbergにはイタリックやボールドなどの強調が抜けていますので、それらは適宜Dover editionから補いました。

■印は、続く引用文の要約で、⇒印は私のコメントです。 下のスライドは、私にとって印象的だったデューイのことばです。

追記 (2013/11/27)





A person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them deliberately, is in so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the essence of discipline. (p.124)


 日本語大辞典第二版(1995: 講談社)には、「規律」の定義として、

“discipline”のそもそもの意味を捉えるために、まずLongman Dictionary of Contemporary English Fifth Edition (2009)で“discipline”を引きました。すると意味の2つ目に
2 the ability to control your own behaviour, so that you do what you are expected to do

次に、プログレッシブ英和中辞典第5版 (2012: 小学館)でdisciplineを引き、ロングマン英英辞書で示された意味に該当すると思われる訳を探すと、意味の2つ目に、 2 (鍛錬のもととなる)規律、規則、しつけ、(学校・軍隊などの)風紀、戒律、自制、自律心
とあります。私は、この中の「自制」や「自律心」がデューイの言う “discipline”の訳として特にあてはまるのではないでしょうか。

従来、“discipline”の意味としてよく用いられる「外的な意味での規律」だけではなく「内的な意味での規律」の存在を、同じ「規律」という語を用いた対比によって強調するという意味で、デューイの言うdisciplineに「規律」という訳を使用することの意義があると思います。ですが、もし私なりにデューイの言うdisciplineの翻訳をするならば、デューイの言う “discipline”の本質をストレートに強調するために「自制」か「自律心」という語を当てはめたく思います。

第10章: 興味と自制 Chapter Ten: Interest and Discipline

1. 用語の意味 (The Meaning of the Terms)

■ 傍観者 (spectator) と行為主もしくは参加者 (agent or participant) の違い

We have already noticed the difference in the attitude of a spectator and of an agent or participant. The former is indifferent to what is going on; one result is just as good as another, since each is just something to look at. The latter is bound up with what is going on; its outcome makes a difference to him. His fortunes are more or less at stake in the issue of events. Consequently he does whatever he can to influence the direction present occurrences take. One is like a man in a prison cell watching the rain out of the window; it is all the same to him. The other is like a man who has planned an outing for the next day which continuing rain will frustrate. He cannot, to be sure, by his present reactions affect to-morrow's weather, but he may take some steps which will influence future happenings, if only to postpone the proposed picnic. If a man sees a carriage coming which may run over him, if he cannot stop its movement, he can at least get out of the way if he foresees the consequence in time. In many instances, he can intervene even more directly. The attitude of a participant in the course of affairs is thus a double one: there is solicitude, anxiety concerning future consequences, and a tendency to act to assure better, and avert worse, consequences. (pp. 119-120)


■ 関心 (concern) と興味 (interest)とは、行為主・参加者の態度

There are words which denote this attitude: concern, interest. These words suggest that a person is bound up with the possibilities inhering in objects; that he is accordingly on the lookout for what they are likely to do to him; and that, on the basis of his expectation or foresight, he is eager to act so as to give things one turn rather than another. (p. 120)


■ 興味/ねらい (interest/aim)の関係と、関心/到達点 (concern/end)の関係は似ている。

Interest and aims, concern and purpose, are necessarily connected. Such words as aim, intent, end, emphasize the results which are wanted and striven for; they take for granted the personal attitude of solicitude and attentive eagerness. Such words as interest, affection, concern, motivation, emphasize the bearing of what is foreseen upon the individual's fortunes, and his active desire to act to secure a possible result. They take for granted the objective changes. (p. 120)

⇒ねらい (aim)・意図 (intent)・到達点 (end)などの語は、結果を強調しているが、興味 (interest)・気持ち (affection)・関心 (interest)・動機づけ (motivation)などの語は、予期や欲望などを強調している。ねらい・意図・到達点は、興味・気持ち・関心・動機づけの存在を前提としており、興味・気持ち・関心・動機づけは、ねらい・意図・到達点の存在を前提としている。

■ ねらい・意図・到達点は対象的 (objective)で非個人的 (impersonal)で知的 (intelectual)なものであるが、興味・気持ち・関心・動機づけは個人的 (personal)で情動的 (emotional)で意志的 (volitional)なものである。だが両者を切り離すことはできない。

But the difference is but one of emphasis; the meaning that is shaded in one set of words is illuminated in the other. What is anticipated is objective and impersonal; to-morrow's rain; the possibility of being run over. But for an active being, a being who partakes of the consequences instead of standing aloof from them, there is at the same time a personal response. The difference imaginatively foreseen makes a present difference, which finds expression in solicitude and effort. While such words as affection, concern, and motive indicate an attitude of personal preference, they are always attitudes toward objects -- toward what is foreseen. We may call the phase of objective foresight intellectual, and the phase of personal concern emotional and volitional, but there is no separation in the facts of the situation. (p. 120)

⇒ "Objective"は「対象的」と訳したが、もちろん「客観的」と訳してもよい(というより、そちらの方が普通よく見る翻訳)。

"Personal"については、マイケル・ポランニー (Michael Polanyi)の"personal knowledge"の議論などを参照されたい。

関連論文: インタビュー研究における技能と言語の関係について http://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/00033696


■ 生きることは環境と不可分。対象的・非人格的領域と切り離された、純粋に個人的・主観的な領域を想定するのは誤り。



Life activities flourish and fail only in connection with changes of the environment. They are literally bound up with these changes; our desires, emotions, and affections are but various ways in which our doings are tied up with the doings of things and persons about us. Instead of marking a purely personal or subjective realm, separated from the objective and impersonal, they indicate the non-existence of such a separate world. They afford convincing evidence that changes in things are not alien to the activities of a self, and that the career and welfare of the self are bound up with the movement of persons and things. Interest, concern, mean that self and world are engaged with each other in a developing situation. (pp. 120-121)


■ 「興味」の三つの意味:(i) 能動的な発展のすべての状態、(ii) 予期し望まれている対象としての結果、(iii) 個人的・情動的な傾向

The word interest, in its ordinary usage, expresses (i) the whole state of active development, (ii) the objective results that are foreseen and wanted, and (iii) the personal emotional inclination. (p. 121)


■ 教育論で「興味」が否定的な意味で語られる時は、たいてい(ii)の意味だけで使われ、子どもを楽しさで釣ることとして語られる。

When the place of interest in education is spoken of in a depreciatory way, it will be found that the second of the meanings mentioned is first exaggerated and then isolated. Interest is taken to mean merely the effect of an object upon personal advantage or disadvantage, success or failure. Separated from any objective development of affairs, these are reduced to mere personal states of pleasure or pain. Educationally, it then follows that to attach importance to interest means to attach some feature of seductiveness to material otherwise indifferent; to secure attention and effort by offering a bribe of pleasure. This procedure is properly stigmatized as "soft" pedagogy; as a "soup-kitchen" theory of education. (pp. 121-122)


■ 浅薄な「興味づけ」が必要と教育者が思う時には、活動の力と目的が結びついていない。この結びつきを学習者に自覚させるのはよいことだが、外から人工的な誘導をして学習者を興味づけることは批判されるべき。

When material has to be made interesting, it signifies that as presented, it lacks connection with purposes and present power: or that if the connection be there, it is not perceived. To make it interesting by leading one to realize the connection that exists is simply good sense; to make it interesting by extraneous and artificial inducements deserves all the bad names which have been applied to the doctrine of interest in education. (pp. 122-123)

■ 自制 (discipline)とは、物事を始めてから終わるまでにであう様々なことに対して、よく考え、粘り強く取り組むこと。

So much for the meaning of the term interest. Now for that of discipline. Where an activity takes time, where many means and obstacles lie between its initiation and completion, deliberation and persistence are required. It is obvious that a very large part of the everyday meaning of will is precisely the deliberate or conscious disposition to persist and endure in a planned course of action in spite of difficulties and contrary solicitations. (p. 123)

⇒デューイは、自制を"deliberation and persistence"に関わるものとし、意志 (will)と重ねあわせて考えている。

■ 意志の二つの側面: (i) 結果の見通し、(ii)見通された結果がその人に対してもつ重み

Clearly there are two factors in will. One has to do with the foresight of results, the other with the depth of hold the foreseen outcome has upon the person. (p. 123)


■ 「頑張り」 (obstinacy) とは、「結果の見通し」を得ている「意志」ではない [(i)の悪い例]

(i) Obstinacy is persistence but it is not strength of volition. Obstinacy may be mere animal inertia and insensitiveness. A man keeps on doing a thing just because he has got started, not because of any clearly thought-out purpose. In fact, the obstinate man generally declines (although he may not be quite aware of his refusal) to make clear to himself what his proposed end is; he has a feeling that if he allowed himself to get a clear and full idea of it, it might not be worth while. Stubbornness shows itself even more in reluctance to criticize ends which present themselves than it does in persistence and energy in use of means to achieve the end. The really executive man is a man who ponders his ends, who makes his ideas of the results of his actions as clear and full as possible. (p. 123)


■ 「意志が弱い」とは、「頑張りが足りない」のではなく、知的に結果を見通せていないということ [(i)の悪い例]

The people we called weak-willed or self-indulgent always deceive themselves as to the consequences of their acts. They pick out some feature which is agreeable and neglect all attendant circumstances. When they begin to act, the disagreeable results they ignored begin to show themselves. They are discouraged, or complain of being thwarted in their good purpose by a hard fate, and shift to some other line of action. That the primary difference between strong and feeble volition is intellectual, consisting in the degree of persistent firmness and fullness with which consequences are thought out, cannot be over-emphasized. (p. 123)



知的仕事のABC: Analyze, Begin and Control!




と、ここまで書いた所でBGMでもかけようかと思ってたまたま手にとったのが、バッハの「フーガの技法」。むちゃくちゃ上から目線の権威主義者みたいな嫌な言い方になるけれど、こういった曲を何度も聞くということは、少なくとも知的に音楽の見通しを得るということにつながると思う。やっぱりクラシック音楽を聞くことと知性を向上させることはつながっている(嫌な言い方でごめんなさい m(_ _)m)。

というより、このようなクラシック音楽につながる文化を西洋近代では知的としてきたのだろう。だから私達はバッハの対位法的な知性だけでなく、例えば武満徹のような遷移的な知性も知るべきなのだろう。さらに例をあげると、パット・メセニーとオーネット・コールマンらによるフリー・ジャズの力を損なわないままに、こういった音楽を見通せる知性も知るべきなのだろう(←いかにもスノッブな、嫌な言い方 by オルター・オイラw)。

■ 観念的・一面的に見通すだけで、その見通しの実質を把握できていない場合もある [(ii)の悪い例]

(ii) There is, of course, such a thing as a speculative tracing out of results. Ends are then foreseen, but they do not lay deep hold of a person. They are something to look at and for curiosity to play with rather than something to achieve. There is no such thing as over-intellectuality, but there is such a thing as a one-sided intellectuality. A person "takes it out" as we say in considering the consequences of proposed lines of action. A certain flabbiness of fiber prevents the contemplated object from gripping him and engaging him in action. And most persons are naturally diverted from a proposed course of action by unusual, unforeseen obstacles, or by presentation of inducements to an action that is directly more agreeable. (p. 124)

⇒過剰な知性はありえないが、一面的知性というのはありうる(There is no such thing as over-intellectuality, but there is such a thing as a one-sided intellectuality)というのはカッコいい台詞だなぁ (←典型的知的スノッブ by リフレクティブ・オイラーw)

■ 自制とは

⇒「自制」 (discipline)の定義部分なので全訳


A person who is trained to consider his actions, to undertake them deliberately, is in so far forth disciplined. Add to this ability a power to endure in an intelligently chosen course in face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty, and you have the essence of discipline. Discipline means power at command; mastery of the resources available for carrying through the action undertaken. To know what one is to do and to move to do it promptly and by use of the requisite means is to be disciplined, whether we are thinking of an army or a mind. Discipline is positive. (p. 124)


■ 興味と自制は、相反するものではなく、相互に結びついているものである。

It is hardly necessary to press the point that interest and discipline are connected, not opposed. (p. 124)


■ 自分がやっていることについて考えるためにも、興味が必要である。子どもの不注意をたしなめるという場合ですら、それは興味を喚起するためであり、やっていることと自分の成長の間のつながりの感覚をもたらすためである。子どもに、自分がやっていることの見通しを考えさせ、そのねらいを体得させなければならない。 [(i)のよい例]

(i) Even the more purely intellectual phase of trained power -- apprehension of what one is doing as exhibited in consequences -- is not possible without interest. Deliberation will be perfunctory and superficial where there is no interest. Parents and teachers often complain -- and correctly -- that children "do not want to hear, or want to understand." Their minds are not upon the subject precisely because it does not touch them; it does not enter into their concerns. This is a state of things that needs to be remedied, but the remedy is not in the use of methods which increase indifference and aversion. Even punishing a child for inattention is one way of trying to make him realize that the matter is not a thing of complete unconcern; it is one way of arousing "interest," or bringing about a sense of connection. In the long run, its value is measured by whether it supplies a mere physical excitation to act in the way desired by the adult or whether it leads the child "to think" -- that is, to reflect upon his acts and impregnate them with aims. (pp. 124-125)

⇒興味を"bringing about a sense of connection"と言っているところにも着目したい。

■ ねばり強さを続けるためには、興味が不可欠 [(ii)のよい例]

(ii) That interest is requisite for executive persistence is even more obvious. Employers do not advertise for workmen who are not interested in what they are doing. If one were engaging a lawyer or a doctor, it would never occur to one to reason that the person engaged would stick to his work more conscientiously if it was so uncongenial to him that he did it merely from a sense of obligation. Interest measures -- or rather is -- the depth of the grip which the foreseen end has upon one, moving one to act for its realization. (p. 125)

⇒ 「興味は、見通された到達点がどのくらい行為者を深くとらえ、その行為者を到達点に向かわせるかを査定している。いや、興味とは、行為者がとらえられ動かされてゆくことそのものだと言えるだろう」 (Interest measures -- or rather is -- the depth of the grip which the foreseen end has upon one, moving one to act for its realization.)という箇所も、興味も(他の概念同様)、外から来る・与えられるものではなく、内と外が統合されて生じるものだというデューイの主張が伺える箇所である。

2. 教育における興味概念の重要性 (The Importance of the Idea of Interest in Education)

■ 興味について考えてゆくと、子どもの個性に着目するようになる。


興味は、目的のある経験において、対象を -- それが実際に知覚されたものであれ想像上のものであれ -- 動かす力を意味している。具体的に言うなら、興味概念の価値は、教育的発達において占める興味の動態的な役割を認識することによって子ども一人ひとりがもつそれぞれの総合力・必要性・好みを考えるようになる、ということにある。

Interest represents the moving force of objects -- whether perceived or presented in imagination -- in any experience having a purpose. In the concrete, the value of recognizing the dynamic place of interest in an educative development is that it leads to considering individual children in their specific capabilities, needs, and preferences. (p. 125)

■ 子どもの個性を考えない、一律的な興味づけというのはありえない。



One who recognizes the importance of interest will not assume that all minds work in the same way because they happen to have the same teacher and textbook. Attitudes and methods of approach and response vary with the specific appeal the same material makes, this appeal itself varying with difference of natural aptitude, of past experience, of plan of life, and so on. (p. 125)

⇒このことからすると、どんな教材(例、定型文、説明文、論証文、文学的文章など)でも、同じアプローチ(例、シャドーイング、和訳先渡し、"all in English"など)で教えなさいという英語教授法は、かなり胡散臭いことがわかる。

そもそも私にとって、教材・学習者・教師・時代背景などなどによっていかようにも変わりうるし、変わらなければならない教育方法を、「一般化」しなければならないとする量的研究の前提は首肯しがたいものである(だから、統計テクニックの洗練や、replicationの重要性や、メタ分析の道入などの「華々しい」研究方法の発展にも私は正直興味がもてない --というより批判的にならざるを得ない)。

英語教育実践支援のためのエビデンスとナラティブ : EBMとNBMからの考察


[研究][SLA] ケンカの後始末,またはSpada & Tomita (2010)について。
[研究][ノート] 補足の補足でメタ分析について覚え書き(山田・井上(編), 2012. Ch.2)

■ ⇒デューイによる二元論批判の箇所として重要だと思われるので、全訳。


Too frequently mind is set over the world of things and facts to be known; it is regarded as something existing in isolation, with mental states and operations that exist independently. Knowledge is then regarded as an external application of purely mental existences to the things to be known, or else as a result of the impressions which this outside subject matter makes on mind, or as a combination of the two. Subject matter is then regarded as something complete in itself; it is just something to be learned or known, either by the voluntary application of mind to it or through the impressions it makes on mind. (pp. 125-126)

⇒"Subject matter"は、「主題」と訳したが、教育の文脈では「教科内容」と訳すことができるだろう。"Operation"はルーマンの英訳でも使われる語だが、ルーマン系の翻訳にしたがって「作動」と訳した。


ちなみに(a)と(b)と(c)が連動し、同時に成立するものだとしたら ―ルーマンはそのような考え方をしている― (a)の「対象」とは「心的対象」でもあり「物的対象」でもあるし、「主観的対象」でもあるし「客観的対象」でもある。そうなると「心と物」や「主観と客観」といった二元論は意味をなさなくなる。

■ 「興味」という概念から考えても、主客二元論はおかしいことがわかる。


興味という事実から、上記の概念化 [ = 二元論] が神話にすぎないことが示される。経験において心は、今ここにある刺激に反応する能力として現れるが、その心とは未来に起こりうる帰結を予期することに基づき、起こるだろう帰結を制御することを目的としている。事物、つまり知られた主題とは、予期される一連の出来事を支援するにせよ阻害するにせよ、それらの出来事に関係するものである。

The facts of interest show that these conceptions are mythical. Mind appears in experience as ability to respond to present stimuli on the basis of anticipation of future possible consequences, and with a view to controlling the kind of consequences that are to take place. The things, the subject matter known, consist of whatever is recognized as having a bearing upon the anticipated course of events, whether assisting or retarding it. (p. 126)

⇒"Control"はここでは「制御」と訳した。"Mind appears"という表現も作動的な含意をもつものであり、"mind exists"といった素朴な存在を前提とする言い方ではないことにも注意。

■ 心は、一連の行為の中に現れるものであり、行為と孤立・独立して存在するモノではない。



mind is not a name for something complete by itself; it is a name for a course of action in so far as that is intelligently directed; in so far, that is to say, as aims, ends, enter into it, with selection of means to further the attainment of aims. Intelligence is not a peculiar possession which a person owns; but a person is intelligent in so far as the activities in which he plays a part have the qualities mentioned. Nor are the activities in which a person engages, whether intelligently or not, exclusive properties of himself; they are something in which he engages and partakes. Other things, the independent changes of other things and persons, cooperate and hinder. The individual's act may be initial in a course of events, but the outcome depends upon the interaction of his response with energies supplied by other agencies. Conceive mind as anything but one factor partaking along with others in the production of consequences, and it becomes meaningless. (p. 127)


■ 教示 (instruction)で大切なのは、一人ひとりの学習者が目的や興味を見出すことができるような教材を見出すこと。


The problem of instruction is thus that of finding material which will engage a person in specific activities having an aim or purpose, of moment or interest to him, and dealing with things not as gymnastic appliances but as conditions for the attainment of ends. (p. 127)

⇒Gutenbergにはpurposeの後のカンマがなかったので補った。"Moment"は、"importance or concequence: a decision of great moment" (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/moment)の意味と解した。

"Dealing with things not as gymnastic appliances"の(おそらくは比喩的な)意味が、実はよくわからない。"Gymnastic appliance"の動画で出てきたのは、例えば下のような動画だが、これを見ても上の意味がよく会得できない。ひょっとしたら"Gymnastic appliance"とは「動きの見栄えをよくするが、動きにとっては本質的ではないもの」ぐらいの意味だろうか。わかった方がいらしたら、ぜひご教示ください。

■ よい教示とは、人が本気で関わらざるを得ないような活動のあり方を見出すこと



Discovery of typical modes of activity, whether play or useful occupations, in which individuals are concerned, in whose outcome they recognize they have something at stake, and which cannot be carried through without reflection and use of judgment to select material of observation and recollection, is the remedy. (pp. 127-128)

■ 心と事物が互いに影響を及ぼし合いながら進展することを考慮した上で、「心の訓練」についても考えなければならない。


In short, the root of the error long prevalent in the conception of training of mind consists in leaving out of account movements of things to future results in which an individual shares, and in the direction of which observation, imagination, and memory are enlisted. It consists in regarding mind as complete in itself, ready to be directly applied to a present material. (p. 128)


■ 教育の歴史において、一方では、「自制」と言うだけで、思考停止が起こり、問題が起こればそれはすべて「自制」が足りない学習者のせいであり、子どもにはさらなる「自制」(あるいは「我慢」)が必要だと誤解されてきた。

In historic practice the error has cut two ways. On one hand, it has screened and protected traditional studies and methods of teaching from intelligent criticism and needed revisions. To say that they are "disciplinary" has safeguarded them from all inquiry. It has not been enough to show that they were of no use in life or that they did not really contribute to the cultivation of the self. That they were "disciplinary" stifled every question, subdued every doubt, and removed the subject from the realm of rational discussion. By its nature, the allegation could not be checked up. Even when discipline did not accrue as matter of fact, when the pupil even grew in laxity of application and lost power of intelligent self-direction, the fault lay with him, not with the study or the methods of teaching. His failure was but proof that he needed more discipline, and thus afforded a reason for retaining the old methods. The responsibility was transferred from the educator to the pupil because the material did not have to meet specific tests; it did not have to be shown that it fulfilled any particular need or served any specific end. It was designed to discipline in general, and if it failed, it was because the individual was unwilling to be disciplined. (p. 128)




■ 他方、「自制」を目の前にある物事にだけ合わせることとして考え、「自制」を未来の目的達成に貢献する力と見出さない自制概念もあった。

In the other direction, the tendency was towards a negative conception of discipline, instead of an identification of it with growth in constructive power of achievement. As we have already seen, will means an attitude toward the future, toward the production of possible consequences, an attitude involving effort to foresee clearly and comprehensively the probable results of ways of acting, and an active identification with some anticipated consequences. Identification of will, or effort, with mere strain, results when a mind is set up, endowed with powers that are only to be applied to existing material. A person just either will or will not apply himself to the matter in hand. The more indifferent the subject matter, the less concern it has for the habits and preferences of the individual, the more demand there is for an effort to bring the mind to bear upon it -- and hence the more discipline of will. To attend to material because there is something to be done in which the person is concerned is not disciplinary in this view; not even if it results in a desirable increase of constructive power. Application just for the sake of application, for the sake of training, is alone disciplinary. This is more likely to occur if the subject matter presented is uncongenial, for then there is no motive (so it is supposed) except the acknowledgment of duty or the value of discipline. The logical result is expressed with literal truth in the words of an American humorist: "It makes no difference what you teach a boy so long as he doesn't like it." (pp. 128-129)


■ 心が活動から切り離されたように、教科内容 (subject matter)も生徒が生きることから切り離され、それだけで価値をもつように思われている。

The counterpart of the isolation of mind from activities dealing with objects to accomplish ends is isolation of the subject matter to be learned. In the traditional schemes of education, subject matter means so much material to be studied. Various branches of study represent so many independent branches, each having its principles of arrangement complete within itself. History is one such group of facts; algebra another; geography another, and so on till we have run through the entire curriculum. Having a ready-made existence on their own account, their relation to mind is exhausted in what they furnish it to acquire. (p. 129)


■ 「指導要領・教科書にあるから教えます」ではなく、「これは、あなたたちが生きることに深く関わっているから教えます」と言えるぐらいに教材研究をする


Numbers are not objects of study just because they are numbers already constituting a branch of learning called mathematics, but because they represent qualities and relations of the world in which our action goes on, because they are factors upon which the accomplishment of our purposes depends. ... Study is effectual in the degree in which the pupil realizes the place of the numerical truth he is dealing with in carrying to fruition activities in which he is concerned. This connection of an object and a topic with the promotion of an activity having a purpose is the first and the last word of a genuine theory of interest in education. (pp. 129-130)





追記 (2013/11/11)



[みんなで英語教育] 第5回「なんで英語なんか勉強するの?」まとめ

3. 問いの社会的側面 (Some Social Aspects of the Question)

■ 興味の最上の例として、芸術がある

Men's fundamental attitudes toward the world are fixed by the scope and qualities of the activities in which they partake. The ideal of interest is exemplified in the artistic attitude. Art is neither merely internal nor merely external; merely mental nor merely physical. Like every mode of action, it brings about changes in the world. (p. 130)


ゲージツを切り捨てようとする「偉い人」には、おじさんはクリエーチブな方法で多種多様に抵抗するのだよ (←オイラー・アズ・ミリタント・アーチストwww)。

■ 「頭」と「手」を切り離して知性や教育を考えてはいけない。


Persons whose interests have been enlarged and intelligence trained by dealing with things and facts in active occupations having a purpose (whether in play or work) will be those most likely to escape the alternatives of an academic and aloof knowledge and a hard, narrow, and merely "practical" practice. To organize education so that natural active tendencies shall be fully enlisted in doing something, while seeing to it that the doing requires observation, the acquisition of information, and the use of a constructive imagination, is what most needs to be done to improve social conditions. (p. 132)


要約 (Summary)


Interest and discipline are correlative aspects of activity having an aim. Interest means that one is identified with the objects which define the activity and which furnish the means and obstacles to its realization. Any activity with an aim implies a distinction between an earlier incomplete phase and later completing phase; it implies also intermediate steps. To have an interest is to take things as entering into such a continuously developing situation, instead of taking them in isolation. The time difference between the given incomplete state of affairs and the desired fulfillment exacts effort in transformation, it demands continuity of attention and endurance. This attitude is what is practically meant by will. Discipline or development of power of continuous attention is its fruit.

The significance of this doctrine for the theory of education is twofold. On the one hand it protects us from the notion that mind and mental states are something complete in themselves, which then happen to be applied to some ready-made objects and topics so that knowledge results. It shows that mind and intelligent or purposeful engagement in a course of action into which things enter are identical. Hence to develop and train mind is to provide an environment which induces such activity. On the other side, it protects us from the notion that subject matter on its side is something isolated and independent. It shows that subject matter of learning is identical with all the objects, ideas, and principles which enter as resources or obstacles into the continuous intentional pursuit of a course of action. The developing course of action, whose end and conditions are perceived, is the unity which holds together what are often divided into an independent mind on one side and an independent world of objects and facts on the other. (pp. 132-133)

"Democracy and Education"読解のためのブログ記事の目次ページ

2 件のコメント:

Curragh さんのコメント...


動画の音源はたぶんヘルベルト・タヘツィ盤ですね。わたしも持っています。オルガンやチェンバロ、ピアノ独奏盤はいろいろ名盤がありますが、複雑なポリフォニーの旋律線がもっとも明瞭に聴けるのは、弦楽合奏盤ではないかと思っております。個人的にお薦めなのが、フレットワークという英国のヴィオール合奏団によるアルバムです。ECM から出ているケラー四重奏団盤もよいと思います。
デューイの主張する「( 心身 )二元論批判」は、教育論のみならず、いまもっとも必要な「視点」なのではないかと思っています … 先生の一連の検証を道しるべとして、岩波版の邦訳を原文と対照してきちんと読んでみたくなりました。

柳瀬陽介 さんのコメント...

Curragh さん、