[この記事は、8/10の全国英語教育学会シンポでの発表のための基礎ノートとして作りました]
佐伯啓思先生の『貨幣と欲望』を読んでアダム・スミスに興味が出て、出たばかりの『道徳感情論』新訳である本書を出張の行き帰りの新幹線で読んだらとても面白く、リフレクションやコミュニケーションについていろいろ洞察を深められると感じました。
本書の翻訳は非常に丁寧で親切であり、この世界的古典が読みやすい日本語で読めるようになったことに対して、私は一読者として心から感謝します（多くの世界の古典が文庫本で読める日本はなんと文化的な国でしょう！私は皮肉でなくそう思っています）。
ですが、この記事では、私なりの用語法と一貫させるため、この新訳の翻訳語とは異なった翻訳語も使うことにします。
また、著作権自由の原典は
Library of Economics and Liberty
から引用しました。
引用の節番号はこのサイトのものです（翻訳書は少し異なる節番号を使用していますが、両者の間の関係はわかりやすいものですから、いちいち翻訳書の節番号を併記することは割愛しました）。
以下、私の関心からのまとめを書きますが、その前に用語の整理をしておきます。これらは重要な語であり、かつ、いくつかは翻訳書とは異なる表現を使っていますので、予め私なりに用語の定義をしておく次第です。
(a) 情動 (emotion)
私はダマシオの神経科学理論で使われている意味の用語として読み、かつ、その意味でこの本を読み通すことができたと信じていますので、この「情動」とは、「感情」より根源的なもので、主に身体で生じるものと定義しておきます。
(b) 感情 (feeling)
これもダマシオの用語法で私は理解し、根源的で身体的な「情動」を意識で感知したものと定義しておきます。
(c) 情感 （affection)
あまり出てこない用語ですが、私はこれもダマシオに倣い、「情動」と「感情」を総称する語として使っています。
(d) 情操 (sentiment)
これは原典の題名(The Theory of Moral Sentiment)でも使われている語であり、"sentiment"は、翻訳では「感情」と訳されることが通常ですが、私は上記の "feeling"との差異を明確にしたかったので「情操」と訳しました（ですから私なりにこの書の題名を翻訳すると『道徳的情操の理論』となります）。私はこの語を、「情動」「感情」「気持ち」「共感」「連帯感」などを総称する語として理解しています。
(e) 感覚 (sense, sensation)
"Sense"を「知覚されたさまざまな情操」、"sensation"を「さまざまな情操を知覚すること」として私は理解しています。
(f) 気持ち(passion)
翻訳書では「激情」と訳されていますが、原文（といっても私は以下に引用した箇所を読んだだけです）を読むと、日本語でいう「激情」ではない意味で使われている箇所もありますので、この語は「激情」よりは広い一般的な意味で使われ、"the state or capacity of being acted on by external agents or forces" (Merriam-Webster) ぐらいを意味するのかと考え、日本語で広い意味を有し、かつ自らの意思で生じさせるものでなく、どこからかやってくる・湧いてくるものである「気持ち」という表現を使うこととしました。
(g) 共感 (sympathy)
この書での重要語です。詳しい意味は以下のまとめで説明しますが、一言でまとめるなら「身体もしくは想像力を基盤とする他者との社会的な連帯感」ぐらいになると理解しています。
(h) 連帯感 (fellow-feeling)
翻訳書は「一体感」と訳していてこれはうまい訳語だと思いましたが、他者との間にどうしても残らざるを得ない差異を強調したかったので「連帯感」と訳すことにしました。
(i) 適合性 (propriety)
「ぴったりと合っている感覚」で、計算や検証によるものではなく、身体的・直感的に感じるものと私は理解しています。
(j) 感性 (sensibility)
カントの『純粋理性批判』の三区分である「感性・知性・理性」、"seisibility, understanding, reason" (Sinnlichkeit, Verstand, Vernunft)の意味での「感性」として理解しています。
それでは以下、『道徳的情操の理論』の私なりのまとめを簡単に書きます。日本語は原典の引用に基いていますが、私なりのまとめ方をしたものであり、抄訳とも呼べないぐらいの変容を経たものです。この本にご興味を持たれた方は、必ず信頼できるこの翻訳書と原典をご自身でチェックしてください。なお、※の箇所は私の蛇足的補足です。
*****
『道徳的情操の理論』
1 道徳は情操に基づく
1.1 私たちは一般規則を考慮して道徳的に行動するのではなく、経験により道徳的情操を学び、その情操に基いて道徳的に行動する。道徳の一般規則とは情操から反省的に形成されたものにすぎない。
It is thus that the general rules of morality are formed. They are ultimately founded upon experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve, or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions; because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of.
III.I.95
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※やはりこの本も大陸合理論への批判として書かれたのか。
2 共感は、身体もしくは想像力を基盤とする他者との社会的な連帯感である
2.1 共感は、何らかの気持ちを伴っての連帯感である
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.
I.I.5
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※ここでの「連帯感」が社会性を表現しているが、後に記すようにアダム・スミスは社会性を非常に重視している。
2.2 共感は身体と想像力を基盤とする
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.
I.I.1
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※原著の冒頭段落であり、後に「共感」とほぼ同意とされる「哀れみ」 (pity) や「同情」 (compassion) ― どちらも「情動」― は、万人が有する人間の原理 (principle)だとしている。これは見るだけで身体に感じられたり、想像力で感じられたりするものだとしているが、身体も想像力も通常は大陸合理論では軽視されがちであること（そして現代の合理性の考えでも軽視されがちであること）に注意。
2.2.1 共感は、瞬時に生じることもある
Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned.
I.I.6
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※現在流行りの概念を臆面もなく使えば、いわゆるミラーニューロンの働きによる共感と言えるかもしれない。
2.2.2 情動は想像力からも生じる
By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.
I.I.2
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※ここでいう「想像力」とは、他人の身になって考えることであり、それにより、他人が感じているはずの感覚をある程度自分も感じることができるとアダム・スミスは主張している。（ちなみに18世紀のこの本に、現代の実験心理学的証拠を求めるべくもないが、彼が引用するさまざまな事例からこの本は「偉大なる人間観察の書」として古典的価値をもっていると思わざるを得ない）。
3 共感は人間の喜びであり、諸判断の基盤である
※理性でなく、身体や想像力に基づく共感という情感が諸判断の基盤であるというのがアダム・スミスのもっとも主張したいことだと私は理解している。
3.1 自らの身体の情動と他人が示す感情が一致する共感ほど喜ばしいものはない
But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary.
I.I.14
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※「情動」と「感情」は、ダマシオの用語法と同じように使い分けられている。
3.1.1 自らの身体の情動がたとえ小さくとも、それが他人の示す感情と一致するなら人間は喜びを感じる。
When we have read a book or poem so often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a companion. To him it has all the graces of novelty; we enter into the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites in him, but which it is no longer capable of exciting in us; we consider all the ideas which it presents rather in the light in which they appear to him, than in that in which they appear to ourselves, and we are amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus enlivens our own.
I.I.15
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※自らはよく知る本などを朗読し、それにより聞き手の感情が変わる経験を引用する点も、アダム・スミスの人間観察の確かさを示しているように思える。
3.2 正当性や適切性の判断は共感によるものである
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such, is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them.
I.I.20
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※ここでいう"original passions"とは、「他人の身体内に生じた元々の気持ち」ぐらいの意味と解した。また"just"や"proper"の判断も大陸合理論などでは理性的な判断とされがちであることに注意。
3.3 共感が想像力によって生じるとすれば、その想像力は、公平な観察者によるものでなければならない。
The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and judgment.
I.I.11
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※この引用箇所では「公平な」(impartial)という形容詞は使われていないが、後には「公平な観察者」 (impartial spectator) という表現が多用される。
3.3.1 感謝や憤りが適切であるかどうかの判断も、公平な観察者の共感に基づく
But these, as well as all the other passions of human nature, seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and goes along with them.
II.I.11
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS2.html#firstpage-bar
※ここでは「公平な観察者」の同意表現として「利害のない傍観者」 (indifferent by-stander) という表現も使われている ― ここでの"indifferent"は"marked by impartiality : unbiased" (Merriam-Webster)の意味と解した。
3.3.2 適切な自己肯定 (self-approbation) や自己否定 (self-disapprobation) のためにも公平な観察者は必要
The principle by which we naturally either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, seems to be altogether the same with that by which we exercise the like judgments concerning the conduct of other people. We either approve or disapprove of the conduct of another man according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments and motives which directed it. And, in the same manner, we either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes and from his station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sympathize with the sentiments and motives which influenced it. We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. Whatever judgment we can form concerning them, accordingly, must always bear some secret reference, either to what are, or to what, upon a certain condition, would be, or to what, we imagine, ought to be the judgment of others. We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, and condemn it.
III.I.2
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※ここでは、人間は社会的な交流（コミュニケーション）を通じて、まず他人について判断することを学び、その過程で生じた（公平な）観察者の意識から自分について判断するようになるという順序も示されている点に注意。
4 相互に共感しようとする中で、「公平な観察者」の意識が生じる
※相互に共感しあえる関係をもつためには、共感しようとする者と共感されようとする者の双方が努力しなければならない。
4.0.1 共感するためには、観察者は、できるだけ観察対象者の身になって考えなければならない
In all such cases, that there may be some correspondence of sentiments between the spectator and the person principally concerned, the spectator must, first of all, endeavour, as much as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other, and to bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which can possibly occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation upon which his sympathy is founded.
I.I.35
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※想像力を使う共感は必ずしも自動的に生じるものではなく、観察者はできるだけ他人に身になるよう努めなければならない。
4.0.2 共感されるためには、自らの気持ちを観察者がついてこられるぐらいに抑えなければならない
He longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the spectators with his own. To see the emotions of their hearts, in every respect, beat time to his own, in the violent and disagreeable passions, constitutes his sole consolation. But he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of going along with him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about him. What they feel, will, indeed, always be, in some respects, different from what he feels, and compassion can never be exactly the same with original sorrow; because the secret consciousness that the change of situations, from which the sympathetic sentiment arises, is but imaginary, not only lowers it in degree, but, in some measure, varies it in kind, and gives it a quite different modification. These two sentiments, however, may, it is evident, have such a correspondence with one another, as is sufficient for the harmony of society. Though they will never be unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or required.
I.I.36
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※この努力から、自制の徳も生じる。アダム・スミスにとってよい社会とは、感性の調和により生じるものであるとも思える（規則への適合よりは、感性の働きを重視するこの発想は日本的な発想でもあると言えるだろうか）。
4.1 共感を得ようとする中で、人は自らの公平 (impartial) な観察者であろうとする意識をもつ
In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the spectators. As they are continually placing themselves in his situation, and thence conceiving emotions similar to what he feels; so he is as constantly placing himself in theirs, and thence conceiving some degree of that coolness about his own fortune, with which he is sensible that they will view it. As they are constantly considering what they themselves would feel, if they actually were the sufferers, so he is as constantly led to imagine in what manner he would be affected if he was only one of the spectators of his own situation. As their sympathy makes them look at it, in some measure, with his eyes, so his sympathy makes him look at it, in some measure, with theirs, especially when in their presence and acting under their observation: and as the reflected passion, which he thus conceives, is much weaker than the original one, it necessarily abates the violence of what he felt before he came into their presence, before he began to recollect in what manner they would be affected by it, and to view his situation in this candid and impartial light.
I.I.37
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※ここも日本的な言い方を臆面なく導入するなら、「思いやり」の大切を説いている箇所であるようにも思える。
4.2 私たちは単に称賛されて喜ぶだけではなく、称賛に値することをしたと自覚した時にも喜ぶ
As ignorant and groundless praise can give no solid joy, no satisfaction that will bear any serious examination, so, on the contrary, it often gives real comfort to reflect, that though no praise should actually be bestowed upon us, our conduct, however, has been such as to deserve it, and has been in every respect suitable to those measures and rules by which praise and approbation are naturally and commonly bestowed. We are pleased, not only with praise, but with having done what is praise-worthy.
III.I.12
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※公平な観察者の意識が自分の中で高まると、実在の他人からの承認だけでなく、公平な観察者からの承認も重要となってくる。もちろんこの観察者は一人よがりなものであってはならない。自らが想像する観察者の公平さを保つことは極めて困難であるが、それだけにそれを保とうとする人は人々に称賛されるとアダム・スミスは考えている。
5 公平な観察者の意識を自らの中に保つ人が有徳であるとされる
5.1 黄金律の補完：自分が人々に愛されている程度に、自ら自分を愛せ
And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and propriety. As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us.
I.I.44
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※キリスト教の「自分を愛するのと同じように隣人（＝他人）を愛しなさい」を補って、「しかし自分を愛するのは、隣人（＝他人）が自分を愛してくれる程度の公正な愛でなければならない」としている（だが、これは律法的な戒律ではなく、社会的動物としての人間の性質が必然とすることである）。
5.1.1 社会的な人間は中庸に落ち着くことが結局一番快適
The propriety of every passion excited by objects peculiarly related to ourselves, the pitch which the spectator can go along with, must lie, it is evident, in a certain mediocrity. If the passion is too high, or if it is too low, he cannot enter into it. Grief and resentment for private misfortunes and injuries may easily, for example, be too high, and in the greater part of mankind they are so. They may likewise, though this more rarely happens, be too low. We denominate the excess, weakness and fury: and we call the defect stupidity, insensibility, and want of spirit. We can enter into neither of them, but are astonished and confounded to see them.
I.II.1
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html
※合理的計算を重んずる文化は時に中庸を軽んずるが、アダム・スミスは他の古今東西の常識知と同様に中庸の重要性を説く。
5.2 完全なる徳を有する人とは、他人の（身体的な）元々の感情と（想像力による）共感的な感情の両方に対して繊細な感性をもち、かつ、その感性を自分の元々の自己中心的な感情の制御につなぐことができる人のことである。
The man of the most perfect virtue, the man whom we naturally love and revere the most, is he who joins, to the most perfect command of his own original and selfish feelings, the most exquisite sensibility both to the original and sympathetic feelings of others.
III.I.77
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※これも日本的な言い方に換えるなら「他人の気持ちがよくわかる」ことの重要さを説いていると言える。
5.3 軸がぶれない人は、公平な観察者の判断を常に忘れない
The man of real constancy and firmness, the wise and just man who has been thoroughly bred in the great school of self-command, in the bustle and business of the world, exposed, perhaps, to the violence and injustice of faction, and to the hardships and hazards of war, maintains this control of his passive feelings upon all occasions; and whether in solitude or in society, wears nearly the same countenance, and is affected very nearly in the same manner. In success and in disappointment, in prosperity and in adversity, before friends and before enemies, he has often been under the necessity of supporting this manhood. He has never dared to forget for one moment the judgment which the impartial spectator would pass upon his sentiments and conduct. He has never dared to suffer the man within the breast to be absent one moment from his attention. With the eyes of this great inmate he has always been accustomed to regard whatever relates to himself. This habit has become perfectly familiar to him. He has been in the constant practice, and, indeed, under the constant necessity, of modelling, or of endeavouring to model, not only his outward conduct and behaviour, but, as much as he can, even his inward sentiments and feelings, according to those of this awful and respectable judge. He does not merely affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really adopts them. He almost identifies himself with, he almost becomes himself that impartial spectator, and scarce even feels but as that great arbiter of his conduct directs him to feel.
III.I.67
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※ "The man of real constancy and firmness"を翻訳書は「志操堅固な人」と巧みに訳していたが、ここでは少し柔らかく「軸がぶれない人」と訳した。ここでの「軸がぶれない」とは「特定の教条に忠実」という意味でなく、「どんな状況下でも公平な観察者の目で自らを見ようとする」という意味であることに注意。
5.4 宗教は、神という公平な観察者の概念により、現世では慰めようのない人にも慰めを与えることができる
To persons in such unfortunate circumstances, that humble philosophy which confines its views to this life, can afford, perhaps, but little consolation. Every thing that could render either life or death respectable is taken from them. They are condemned to death and to everlasting infamy. Religion can alone afford them any effectual comfort. She alone can tell them, that it is of little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-seeing Judge of the world approves of it. She alone can present to them the view of another world; a world of more candour, humanity, and justice, than the present; where their innocence is in due time to be declared, and their virtue to be finally rewarded: and the same great principle which can alone strike terror into triumphant vice, affords the only effectual consolation to disgraced and insulted innocence.
III.I.19
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※一神教的な「神」の発明とは、やはりいろいろな意味で人類史を変える出来事だったと思える。
6 公平な観察者とコミュニケーション
6.1 自らを省みる時、自分は観察者と行為者 (agent) に分かれる（しかし、観察者である自分が行為者である自分を適切に評価することは極めて困難）。
When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the judge; the second the person judged of. But that the judge should, in every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as impossible, as that the cause should, in every respect, be the same with the effect.
III.I.6
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※リフレクションとは、行為者でしかなかった自分を、行為者の自分と観察者の自分に分化させることである。だが適切なリフレクションは容易なことではない。
6.2 他人との社会的交流からしか、自分を見る鏡 （公平な観察者）は生じない。
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and deformity of his own mind.
III.I.3
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS3.html#firstpage-bar
※容易に観察できる他人について判断し、また他人同士の判断を観察することにより、私たちはようやく自分についても判断することを学ぶことができるようになる。こうなると社会的経験が極度に乏しい者の自己判断は怖いことがわかる。社交と会話は人間を正気に保つために必要である。
6.3 社会的コミュニケーションを経ずに、自らの政治的決定を至高と定める者ほど傲慢な者はいない
Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman. But to insist upon establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all opposition, every thing which that idea may seem to require, must often be the highest degree of arrogance. It is to erect his own judgment into the supreme standard of right and wrong. It is to fancy himself the only wise and worthy man in the commonwealth, and that his fellow-citizens should accommodate themselves to him and not he to them. It is upon this account, that of all political speculators, sovereign princes are by far the most dangerous. This arrogance is perfectly familiar to them. They entertain no doubt of the immense superiority of their own judgment.
VI.II.43
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS6.html#firstpage-bar
※政治的判断とは、さまざまに異なる多くの人を巻き込む判断であるが、それを、社会的コミュニケーションを減ることなしに、特定個人が一人でしかも一気に決定できると思い上がることは傲慢であるだけでなく危険である。リフレクションにしても、コミュニケーションを必要とすると言えよう。
6.4 率直で開かれたコミュニケーションが共感そして道徳をもたらす
Frankness and openness conciliate confidence. We trust the man who seems willing to trust us. We see clearly, we think, the road by which he means to conduct us, and we abandon ourselves with pleasure to his guidance and direction. Reserve and concealment, on the contrary, call forth diffidence. We are afraid to follow the man who is going we do not know where. The great pleasure of conversation and society, besides, arises from a certain correspondence of sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments coincide and keep time with one another. But this most delightful harmony cannot be obtained unless there is a free communication of sentiments and opinions. We all desire, upon this account, to feel how each other is affected, to penetrate into each other's bosoms, and to observe the sentiments and affections which really subsist there. The man who indulges us in this natural passion, who invites us into his heart, who, as it were, sets open the gates of his breast to us, seems to exercise a species of hospitality more delightful than any other. No man, who is in ordinary good temper, can fail of pleasing, if he has the courage to utter his real sentiments as he feels them, and because he feels them. It is this unreserved sincerity which renders even the prattle of a child agreeable. How weak and imperfect soever the views of the open-hearted, we take pleasure to enter into them, and endeavour, as much as we can, to bring down our own understanding to the level of their capacities, and to regard every subject in the particular light in which they appear to have considered it.
VII.IV.28
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS7.html#firstpage-bar
※お互いの気持ちと意見を率直に表現しながら、共感が深まることがコミュニケーションが目指すことと言えるかもしれない。そのようなコミュニケーションは人間の道徳性を促進し、よい社会の基盤となる。
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追記
この他にも、この本にはこれからの私の生き方の指針にしたいようなすばらしい記述が多くありましたが、今は時間がありませんので、その引用は割愛します。
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